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Computer Visualization of Battlefield Tenets 
W. G. KEMPLE AND H. J. LARSON 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943, U.S.A. 
Abstract-The Battle Enhanced Analysis Methodologies (BEAM) project was designed to inves- 
tigate the use of computer graphics in describing the performance of battalion-sized units in simulated 
combat,. These descriptions were to be data-based and objective, providing useful critiques of actual 
performance according to standard Army doctrine. They would be natural candidates for use at the 
Army’s Combat Training Centers. 
The project was conducted in two phases. In the first, objective graphic displays were derived which 
portray the destructive potential of direct fire weapons (the shooter must be able to see the target) 
in the defense. These displays allow straightforward objective comparisons of different defensive 
alignments and, from simulated battle runs, of defensive fire control strategies. These references also 
describe simple uncluttered displays that portray the movements and interactions of company (or 
higher) sized units throughout a battle. 
This paper describes results of the second phase of the BEAM project. A major result is the 
derivation of displays which portray the destructive potential of indirect fire weapons (the shooter 
normally cannot see the target) in the defense using the same units as the direct fire displays. This 
allows separate and joint examination of the direct and indirect fire destructive potential, providing, 
among other things, objective measures of the synchronization and agility of a force, as well as 
indicators of its intelligence function. 
Ke~ords-visualization, Destructive potential, Battlefield tenets, Agility, Synchronization. 
INTRODUCTION 
To maximize combat readiness, the U.S. Army employs highly instrumented combat ranges for 
training troops under the most realistic possible conditions. Many of these ranges accommodate 
force-on-force battles, including simulated firings of weapons and of kills against the opponent; 
the physical variables used in these simulated kills (times of events, locations of players) are then 
available for computer replays, including investigations of the effects of changes to some battle 
details. 
A General Accounting Office report has criticized the Army for not making better use of ob- 
jective observable measures in improving the training experience. The Battle Enhanced Analysis 
Methodology (BEAM) project has the important goal of using player and event time-location 
data to (objectively) visually portray the effectiveness of combat unit performance according to 
the standard battlefield tenets. 
The ability of a force to inflict damage on an enemy at a given time varies from place to place 
on the battlefield. A surface whose height reflects the spatial distribution of this ability is useful 
for comparing performances of units which may employ different plans or tactics. Because such a 
surface is comparative in nature, its actual height for any given battlefield location is not of major 
importance. Its consistency in identifying locations at which the force has equal potential to do 
damage (equal heights) versus those locations where the potential is larger (greater heights) or 
smaller (lesser heights) is important, as is consistency across displays of alternate plans or tactics. 
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As reported in the results of the first phase of the BEAM project (see [l-4]), this approach 
proves useful in describing the Destructive Potential (DP) of direct fire weapons (the shooter 
must see the target) in the defense and in examining the synchronization of these weapons. In 
these situations, the main factors under the commander’s control that will cause differences in DP 
are the placements of the friendly weapons systems and the fire control measures employed. The 
height of the DP surface at any point on the battlefield is determined by the number and type 
of friendly weapon systems which can engage the enemy at that point, the distances of these 
weapon systems from that point and the composition of the enemy force. 
More specifically, the direct fire Destructive Potential DPdf(z, y) at point (x,~J) on the bat- 
tlefield, for a battalion in the defense, is determined by the types and locations of defending 
weapon systems, their lines of sight, and associated probabilities of killing a target at the given 
point. Let index w identify a defending weapon system and let index t represent an enemy target 
type; the weapon system may have two or more different armaments. For the given defensive 
position, it then is possible to determine the points x, y on the battlefield which are within the 
effective ranges of the armaments and for which line of sight exists. Thus, we can define Bernoulli 
(0,l) variables L,,t for each defending weapon system w and target type t; L,,t is 0 for all targets 
of type t at points 2, y which are out of range of the armament or for which line of sight does not 
exist. 
For each defending weapon system, p,.,w,t is the probability a target of type t at location x, y 
would be hit and killed by a round fired by armament w at range r from x, y. Granted armament w 
can fire R,,t rounds per minute, the expected number of kills to be made in one minute by 
armament w against (instantaneously replaced) targets of type t at point x, y is Rw,tL,,tpT,w,t. 
Granted an attacking force is composed of different target types, let ft represent the fraction of 
the attacking force of type t. The Operational Lethality Index (OLI) for weapon type w against 
location s,y is defined by Lamont [5] as OLI,(x, y) = Et ftRw,tL,,tp,,,,t, the total number of 
expected kills to be made in one minute by this weapon system at location x, y. Finally, the direct 
fire Destructive Potential for the defending force, at point X, y, with weapon systems located at 
their given positions, is the sum of these OLI, values: 
Dpdf (X> Y) = c oLIw(x, Y) = y F; WL,tL,tpr,w,t. (1) 
w VJ t 
This DP surface has units of kills-per-minute; it is not claimed to actually represent the ex- 
pected number of kills which would be made at point x, y in any actual or simulated battle. 
Bather it provides easily interpreted comparative values for judging 
those areas in which the commander has chosen to concentrate his fire in selecting the 
locations for the defending weapons. 
which of several different defending force dispositions and/or fire control measures is better 
aligned with the commander’s intent. 
the ability of the force, as deployed, to adjust its concentration of fires in response to the 
enemy’s actions. 
In addition to these DP displays, simplified intuitive displays of the movements and interactions 
of company or higher sized units over the course of a battle have been described. These employ 
standard army symbology to identify units; the time trace of the locations of the units is easily 
visible, as is the dispersion within the units. These can provide clear uncluttered indications 
of the maneuver of several units through the course of the battle. They can also be used to 
provide indicators of the agility and intelligence functions of units (see the later discussion of 
synchronization, agility and intelligence). 
All of these displays were constructed with data observed from units undergoing training at the 
National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California, using available computer hardware and 
software. Since no single available software package was capable of doing the necessary computing 
Computer Visualization 27 
and graphic display, a mixture of platforms and programs was used. This made the production 
of these displays very time consuming and limited their portability. 
During the second phase of the project, it was decided to investigate the use of different 
computer s,oftware: to make the production of displays faster and more straightforward, and 
to easily incorporate a graphical user interface. In addition, effort was concentrated on the 
production of graphic displays to show the effects of indirect fire, and the agility of forces. The 
resu!ts of these efforts are described in succeeding sections. 
SOFTWARE, USER INTERFACE 
The displays produced during the first phase were derived from position-location data observed 
at the NTC, together with a digital terrain representation of the NTC. Different computer plat- 
forms were involved, as were numerous software packages which contributed various facets of the 
final displays. To unify and simplify this operation, the TAE+ and PV-Wave software packages 
were investigated. TAE+ has a well-developed graphical user interface; unfortunately, the ob- 
jects which it displays must be created with its own editor, which is incapable of handling the 
computational demands of the destructive potential dispfays. 
PV-Wave was known to be capable of creating the graphics required, and was expected to 
soon have a graphical user interface development tool, which could easily interact with the BEAM 
displays. Since this user interface tool was not currently available, the Wave control language was 
used to both create the graphics and display them, doing away with the ii~termediate requirements 
of other platforms and software packages. 
INDIRECT FIRE 
Direct fire weapons do not account for the total Destructive Potential for a defending battal- 
ion. Standard doctrine calls for additional support provided by indirect fire (from both mortars 
and artillery fire) as well as possible air support. Commanders at all levels are responsible for 
integrating fire support into their plans (see [7, p. 941 for more detail). The same basic approach 
is feasible for any and all of these; explicit attention has been given to the development of a 
DP surface for artillery fire, described and illustrated in this section. 
The artillery fire DP surface is derived in units of kills per minute, to be ~onlpatible with the 
direct fire surfa.ce; this allows addition of the two surfaces to see how well the two have been 
integrated in the overall plan, if desired. Review of doctrine and interviews with U.S. Army and 
Marine Corps officers identified several variables that affect the use and effectiveness of artillery 
fire. Some of these officers have had command experience, and several had participated in training 
at the NTC on opposing forces, as observer controllers or with the training unit; some had Desert 
Storm experience. The experience of these officers was used to model the effects of key variables: 
the types of artillery weapons available together with the types of rounds employed, the numbers 
and locations of observers for controlling this fire, the locations of barriers and the target reference 
points (TRPs), the trafficability of the terrain and the enemy force mix. 
It is assumed that artillery support is provided by an artillery battalion, which provides one 
or more Firing Units (FWs). The attacking force is assumed to be armored; thus the FUs are 
assumed to be 155 mm and/or 8 in tubes, since t,hese are the only ones which are effective against 
this type of force. The Fire Direction Center (FDC) is assumed to know the locations of the FUs 
and their characteristics; it (and the FUs) know the locations of the TRPs. Based on the officer 
experience already described, the probability of an artillery salvo killing a tank or Armored 
Personnel Carrier (APC), located at point z, y, is assumed to be P,,, = 0.9, using Dual Purpose 
ICM ammunition. This is the assumed maximum probability of a kill at each point under “ideal” 
conditions and information, for either type of FU; these ideal conditions may not exist at all 5, y 
and Pmax for targets at such points is reduced to account for this. 
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The “ideal” conditions which give the largest value for scoring a kill are the following: 
l An observer is sufficiently close to the point x,y, has LOS to that point, observes 
target and calls for fire. 
o The point X, y is within 2 kilometers of a TRP. 
l The target is stationary at the given point. 
the 
(It is also assumed that the locations of the FUs allow them to range over the whole battle- 
field; if this does not hold, the discussion below is still appropriate by including one ~ditional 
multiplicative factor with values 1 or 0, depending on whether the point Z,YJ is within range of 
an FU.) 
The probability of scoring a kill at 2, y is degraded for any one or more of these conditions 
which do not hold; the way in which the probability of scoring a kill is degraded is to some degree 
arbitrary. Different weight functions describing the degradation in l’,,, were shown to selected 
officers; they were asked to choose which of these were most appropriate for the various factors, 
and to supply necessary parameter values for the functions. For example, the range from the fire 
control observer to the target should have an inverse effect on P,,ax; as this range increases, the 
probability of a salvo scoring a kill should decrease. A bell-shaped bisquare weight function was 
recommended for this effect, described below and pictured in Figure 1. It is worth noting that 
the weight function to be described, and their parameter values, are easily changed. Separate 
procedures were written for the weight functions used; the parameter values needed are specified 
by procedure inputs, and both the shapes of the functions and their parameter values are easily 







Figure 1. Bisquare weight for range from observer. 
Four different functions have been employed in effecting the degradations to Pm=; three of 
these were chosen from the officer discussions just described. The fourth was suggested later 
during a briefing of this material. The indirect fire displays to be presented below were derived 
using the functions to be described; the methodology employed is appropriate for any desired 
shapes and parameter values. 
Pirst, if one or more observers has line of sight to point x, y, then the closest observer is 
assumed to call fire on that point. The range from this closest observer to x, y is used to degrade 
the probability of scoring a kill. This is done using a bisquare weight function 
fl (?-If = 
0.3 + 0.7 (1 - ~:/36)~, for ri < 6 km 
0.3, for ri > 6 km, 
pictured in Figure 1. With ri the range from the observer to X, y, 0.3 5 fi(ri) 5 1, with 
this smallest value occurring for all ranges of 6 km or more. The probability P,,, is multiplied 
by fi(rr). 
Second, the initial approach taken to account for whether or not the point x, y is close to a TRP 
was to use a “cookie cutter” function, pictured in Figure 2. The closer the desired firing point is 
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Figure 2. Cookie-cutter weight for range from observer. 
Figure 3. Linear-decay weight for range from observer. 
to a TRP, the more likely a kill will be scored. This function is 
A (%> = { :‘,, 
* > 
;: ;: ; ;;; 
, 
used to adjust for the distance, ~2~ from X, 2/ to the closest usable TRP. 
(3) 
This degradation caused by distance from the target to the closest TRP has also been modelled 
with a second function (suggested during a briefing of these results) which declines linearly from 1 
to 0.65; this function is 
for r2 < 2 km, 
for r2 > 2 km, 
as pictured in Figure 3. Subsequent displays show the differences (and similarities) of results 
derived using these two functions. If x, y lies within 2 km of a TRP, Pm,, is multiplied by fz(rz) 
(for initial output displays) or by f;(rz) for subsequently computed displays; in either case, if zr, y 
is more than 2 km from a TRP, P,,, is multiplied by 0.65. 
Finally, the faster an enemy weapon system can travel, the less likely it is to be hit by artihery. 
This is accounted for by considering the trafficability at each point on the battlefield. Let s be 
the trafficability (expected speed of the target) at point ZE, y; if the target is stationary, then s = 0 
and the probability of scoring a kill is not degraded. As s increases, the probability of scoring a 
kill is degraded by using the exponential decay function 
f3(s) = 
0.35 -+ 0.65e-~~:~~-‘, for s < 35 km/hr, 
0.35, for s > 35 km/hr, 
(5) 
pictured in Figure 4. For any target whose speed is 35 km/hr or more, the multiplier is 0.35. 
These degradation factors are the same for either type of FU employed. To summarize, 
for any given FU of type w, the probability of scoring a kill at point z,y is the product 
f3ts)f2tr2)fi(rl)pm~~. Again, as with direct fire, if FU w can fire R, rounds per minute, the 
expected number of kills scored per minute at point s,y is the Operational Lethality Index 




Figure 4. Exponential decay for speed of target, 
O,!&,(X,~) = R,f3(s)f2(~~)fi(~1)P~~~; granted two or more FUs may be employed, the indirect 
fire Destructive Potential is the sum 
Since both Destructive Potentials are in units of kills/minute, they may be added together to 
give the total Destructive Potential DP(z, y) = II)P&(z, y) + DQ(s, y). 
The same NTC battle used for the direct fire Destructive Potential displays (see 141) has been 
employed for DPif(z, y) displays. This featured an armor-heavy task force with a defense in 
sector mission; the task force commander intended to destroy the enemy in Engagement Areas 
SHARK and PIRANHA. The observed scenario was followed in locations and movements of the 
defending force; twelve command leaders at various levels were designated as being the observers, 
who could then call for fire against designated targets. Assumed artillery support is provided by 
an artillery battalion, which supplies two FUs (155 mm or 8in tubes). 
To see their effect, a barrier is simulated in Engagement Area CUDA (this is done by reducing 
the trafficability with fs(s)) and TRPs are placed at the corners of the engagement areas. To 
simulate the reductions in force caused by casualties, half of the observers were chosen at random 
at time T = 30 minutes into the battle and were removed (killed), leaving six observers to call 
fire; again at time T = 90, half the remaining observers were removed, leaving three to call fire. 
At time T = 90, the barrier was assumed breached in two places and the defender’s artillery rate 
of fire was cut in half; this was done to simulate the effects of tubes having become casualties, 
troop fatigue, logistic problems with maintaining supplies, etc. 
A total of 6 DPif(z, g) displays are presented; these represent the resulting surface at times 
T = 0 (start of the battle), as well as T = 30 and T = 90. Figures 5, 7, and 9 use the 
original cookie-cutter function fs(rz) to describe the degradation caused by the range between 
the point 5, y and the closest TRP; Figures 6, 8, and 10 use the linear-decay function fz (~2) for 
this same purpose. To sharpen the comparison of the cookie-cutter and linear-decay functions, 
the same observers were “randomly” removed at times 30 and 90, mentioned above. 
The overall picture is the same in both three-figure sequences. First, the dramatic increase 
in DPif caused by the barrier is evident throughout each sequence, as are the breaches in the 
barrier at T = 90. Next, moving forward in time, the loss of observers at T = 30 results in fewer 
areas with high DPif, and the further loss of observers coupled with the reduction in firing rate 
at 2’ = 90 result in very low DPQ throughout the battlefield except at the barrier. 
In addition, one can readily see the difference caused by the cookie-cutter versus the linear- 
decay function. In the first sequence of figures, at times T = 0 and T = 30, the cookie-cutter 
function causes large, homogeneous areas of high lIPif, making it difficult to observe the effect of 
distance from a TRP on DPif. In the second sequence, using the linear-decay function, the DPif 
surface decreases smoothly away from the TRPs, highlighting their importance. 
This approach for indirect fire DP can be easily modified in a number of ways. The degrading 
functions fifm), fif*), f3t.I can be of any desired shape and value; the cutoff values where the 
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Figure 5. Indirect fire destructive potential at T = 0, cookie-cutter weight function 
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Figure 6. Indirect fire destructive potential at T = 0, linear-decay weight function 
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Figure 9. Indirect fire destructive potential at T = 90, cookie-cutter weight function. 
30 55 60 
Kilometers 
Figure 10. Indirect fire destructive potential at T = 90, linear-decay weight function. 
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functions remain constant can occur at other values and the constant achieved can be different. If 
other degrading factors are desirable, they can easily be added in the same way. Other indirect fire 
DP measures (e.g., close air support) can be modelled and pictured in the same way. PV-WAVE 
allows one to simultaneously display several surfaces on the screen, or to create postscript image 
files, that maintain the same color contour values for all figures. 
ATTACK POSTURES VERSUS DEFENSE 
As discussed, both DPdf(x, y) and DPi/(x, y) are defined for a defending force. The same basic 
concepts are appropriate for an attacking force. The destructive potentials are static measures, 
defined for a particular time epoch 17. The indirect fire destructive potential DPij(x, y) for an 
attacking force can be defined in essentially the same manner as employed above. For an attacking 
force, the indirect iire Destructive Potential should profit from the targets being (essentially) 
static; it may suffer from the fact that the observer(s) calling for fire may be moving and that the 
targets may be in protected positions. Appropriate degradations for these effects can be easily 
incorporated into the indirect fire Destructive Potential. 
The direct fire Destructive Potential for an attacking force can also be defined in a similar 
manner to that previously discussed. That is> at any given time 5” the locations of attacking 
vehicles are fixed (as are the locations of the defending force); lines of sight from these positions 
can be determined. If the attacking vehicles are capable of firing while moving (perhaps with 
degraded probabilities of scoring hits and kills, as well as rates of fire), then again a surface 
representing expected kills per minute can usefuily describe their destructive potential. 
INDICATORS OF SYNCHRONIZATION, 
AGILITY AND INTELLIGENCE 
Destructive Potential displays can be very useful in critiquing unit performance at the NTC. At 
the start of any given defensive battle, the DP surface should achieve its largest values at the areas 
of importance stressed by the commanders Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield; the color- 
coded display of the surface immediately indicates whether this has occurred or not. For persons 
well-acquainted with the terrain over which the battle is to be fought, it is a relatively simple 
matter to find alternative defensive positions which result in a DP surface which achieves its 
maximum values at appropriate locations. This provides an objective critique of the commander’s 
initial positioning of his forces in the defense. 
The Destructive Potential surface for a force in the defense can be examined at any time in 
a simulated battle. Let T represent the time parameter for the battle, with T = 0 being the 
“starting time,” and DPT(z, y) the height over x,y at time T. This surface depends only on 
the defensive locations, their lines of sight, firepower available and the initial enemy force mix; 
it is totally independent of actual enemy locations. In a simulated battle, it is possible to record 
the height, of the DP surface over those points z,y E rt, on the battlefield which are actually 
occupied by enemy weapon systems, giving the T~e~~~~c~L Destructive Potential at time T: 
TDPT = Z=z,yfRr DPrfx, y). With an attacking force, the set of occupied locations RT will 
change with T as the vehicles move. The trace of this quantity over time proves useful for a 
number of things. If the defense is well synchronized and agile, this quantity should be and 
remain close to its maximum possible as the battle progresses (T increases). 
TDPT, as just defined, will automatically decrease at any time T at which the defense kills an 
attacking weapon (since the set of occupied 2, y positions RT will decrease in size). If a particular 
attacker, located at position x’,~‘, is killed at time T’, let the height of the DP surface at that 
point (at that time) be DPT~(x’, y’). Define the Realized Defensive Potential at time T to be the 
sum of these heights where kills occurred, at times T’ < T: 
RDPT = c DPT~(x, y). 
(Z’>Y’) 
(7) 
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This quantity represents credit earned which should be given to the defense for kills already made 
by time T. Now define the Applied Destmctive Potential to be ADPT = TDPT + RDPT, the 
sum of the theoretical and realized destructive potentials. 
ADPT does not drop in value when the defense scores a kill; it does drop in value if the locations 
of the attacking systems move to places where the defenders Destructive Potential surface is lower, 
For a well-synchronized defense, ADPT should achieve and maintain a high value through time; 
this will occur only if the high values of the defenders DP surface correctly track the locations 
of the attacking weapon systems. Thus, ADPT provides an objective, numeric measure of the 
synchronization of the defending force. 
Relative changes in ADPT (over time) indicate the rate at which the Applied Destructive 
Potential is increasing or decreasing; the sign of the relative change indicates whether AD& is 
increasing (+) or decreasing (-). ADPT is increasing whenever the defender is successful in 
placing higher values of DP over the enemy locations, and is decreasing when it is not successful 
in this goal. If the defense is agile, it should correctly anticipate the enemy’s actions, leading 
to ADPT increasing (or at least not decreasing); if it is not agile, and does not accomplish this 
goal then ADPT is decreasing (attack is agile). If ADPT were actually measured continuously in 
time, then its derivative with respect to time T gives this measure of agility. Granted ADPT will 
be computed only at specific times TO = 0, TX, Tz, . . . ; this measure of agility can be computed 
at time Tj by 
AGTj = 
ADPT~ - AD.?‘T~_, 
Tj-Tj-l ‘ (8) 
AGT~ > 0 indicates the defense is agile (ADP is nondecressing), while AGT~ < 0 means the 
attacker is agile (ADP is decreasing). 
This Applied Destructive Potential ADPT can also be used in measuring the intelligence func- 
tion of the defense. At time T, the defending force has an implied belief in the locations of the 
attacking enemy through the DPT surface; that is, granted the defender is rational, the maximum 
value(s) of DPT should correspond with the places the defender (through his intelligence) thinks 
the enemy is located (at time T). In any battle simulation, one also knows where the attacking 
weapon systems are in fact located. The worth or usefulness of the defender’s intelligence is 
indicated by comparing these locations. If the defender’s intelligence is perfect, the DPT surface 
is high at the actual enemy locations and thus ADPT is high. It is low if this is not the case. The 
previously discussed movement and maneuver displays can be used to get an objective measure 
of the “worth” of the defender’s intelligence at time T. 
Nelson [i’] identified useful descriptors of the centroid (or middle) of a unit, as well as descriptors 
of its dispersion or geographic spread. For concreteness, let the centroid be determined by the 
median location and the dispersion by Nelson’s convex hull (at time T). Define AT as the volume 
under DPT over this convex hull (for the actual locations of the attackers at time T). 
This centroid could then also be located at the maximum value of the DPT surface, the location 
the defending force thinks is most likely for the enemy (at time T) and the convex hull can also 
be placed there. Now define & as the volume under DPT over this “‘expected” convex hull (from 
the defender’s point of view). The difference INTT = AT - ET will always be less than or equal 
to 0 and provides an objective measure of the quality of the intelligence of the defense (or of the 
quality of use of this intelligence). The closer INTT is to 0, the better the intelligence of the 
defense; through time as the battle progresses, INTT provides a trace of the intelligence usage 
of the defense. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The objectives of the second phase of the BEAM project were threefold: to investigate the 
use of unifying software to make the production of displays faster and more straightforward and 
develop a graphical user interface; to derive graphic displays which show the spatial distribution 
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Destructive Potential due to indirect fire weapons; and to investigate the utility of the graphical 
displays for evaluating the agility of forces. The PV-Wave software package was used to generate 
and display indirect fire DP displays. But, the graphical user interface creation tool was not 
available, so the procedures developed must be executed from the command line. A comprehen- 
sive graphical user interface that will allow rapid switching between displays is highly desirable. 
Displays were developed that show the spatial distribution of DP due to indirect fire weapons 
(artillery) in the same units as the DP due to direct fire weapons. They show the effects of differ- 
ent placements of observers, target reference points, obstacles, and artillery firing units, as well as 
the effects of varying trafficability and attrition of the force over time. These displays can be used 
separately, or combined with the direct fire displays. Measures were developed which allow DP 
to be combined with information about the enemy’s actual positions to evaluate the agility of 
the force and its use of tactical intelligence. The direct fire and indirect fire DP displays, and 
the derived measures, should be very useful for critiquing performance at the Army’s National 
Training Center. The same principles can be used to develop displays as tactical decision aids, 
imbedded in tactical C31 systems. 
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